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1 BOOK REVIEW
2 A comprehensive guide to the New Mechanistic
3 Philosophy
4 Stuart Glennan: The New Mechanical Philosophy. Oxford:
5 Oxford University Press, 2017, 288pp, £30 HB
6 Dingmar van Eck1
7
8  Springer Nature B.V. 2018
9
10 Stuart Glennan’s The New Mechanical Philosophy is an impressive, first-rate
11 achievement and a very welcome addition to the literature on what has come to be
12 called the New Mechanical Philosophy (NMP). Glennan summarizes his view on
13 NMP as follows: ‘‘the New Mechanical Philosophy is both a philosophy of nature
14 and a philosophy of science. It tells us something about how the world is, as well as
15 something about how we, particularly through the methods and institutions of
16 science, may come to know that world’’ (59). In The New Mechanical Philosophy,
17 Glennan thus attempts to clarify relationships between mind-independent reality and
18 our representations of reality—and he does so in admirable fashion. The New
19 Mechanical Philosophy offers an elaborate account of what mechanisms are as
20 things in the world, of kinds and types of mechanisms, and it details a mechanistic
21 account of causation. Furthermore, it offers an informative account of what
22 mechanic models are, how we may come to explain the workings of mechanisms
23 through models, and how we may classify particular mechanisms into kinds and
24 types through the use of models. On top of that, the book investigates how
25 mechanistic explanations relate to and differ from other types of (non-mechanistic
26 and non-causal) explanations.
27 There are several important features that set The New Mechanical Philosophy
28 apart from other literature on NMP, first of all its focus and scope. Whereas most of
29 the NMP literature is primarily focused on semantic, epistemological, and
30 methodological issues as regards mechanistic explanation and mechanism discovery
31 in specific scientific domains, Glennan also assigns center stage to ontological
32 questions (e.g., ‘‘what mechanisms are as things in the world’’ (10); what ‘‘a
33 mechanistic account of the nature of causality’’ (145) looks like). Glennan sets out
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34 to explore how answers to these questions partly inform our answers to semantic
35 and epistemological questions. Equally important, The New Mechanical Philosophy
36 stresses the importance of modeling practices—a set of related issues that has not
37 received the sustained analysis that it deserves in the NMP literature—in procuring
38 answers to ontological questions. For instance, how modeling impacts the
39 classification of mechanisms into kinds and types. The pivotal motivation for
40 tackling such ontological and epistemic issues in tandem, and attempting to connect
41 them, is the very sensible idea that while mechanisms exist as particulars in the
42 world, the sciences are driven by a quest for generality—to say general things about
43 kinds of things (mechanisms) in the world. It is this search for generality, where the
44 importance of modeling comes to the fore. The elaborate analysis of models and
45 modeling techniques as a toolkit for general explanation and classification is a key
46 strength of the book.
47 The New Mechanical Philosophy is very rich in content and I cannot do justice to
48 all the issues that it addresses. So, although definitely worthy of attention and apt to
49 elicit dispute and further analysis, I leave aside the mechanistic theory of causation
50 that is elaborated and defended against regularity and difference-making approaches
51 to causation. I rather choose to focus on the modeling parts of the book and the
52 proposed account of ‘‘minimal mechanisms’’ with which the books starts and which
53 provides the conceptual backdrop of the ontological and epistemological issues that
54 are addressed in The New Mechanical Philosophy.
55 Chapter 2 elaborates an account of what mechanisms are as things in the world,
56 which Glennan characterizes as ‘‘minimal mechanisms’’: ‘‘A mechanism for a
57 phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and interactions are
58 organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon’’ (17). This characterization is
59 minimal in the sense that it conceives of virtually all causal processes as
60 mechanisms and is intended to serve descriptive and ontological goals: the
61 characterization is intended to be minimal or broad enough such that it captures
62 most of the items that scientists label ‘‘mechanisms.’’ And it is intended to enable us
63 to pose general questions about the causal structure of the world, viz. the nature of
64 causal and constitutive relationships in the world. Glennan elaborates this
65 characterization by detailing the key concepts involved—entities, activities,
66 organization, etc.—but also situates the ‘‘New Mechanical Ontology’’ more broadly
67 in metaphysics. This latter excursion is quite nice for it clarifies points of contact
68 between the metaphysics of mechanism and neighboring metaphysical debates such
69 as the relationships between simples and composites and the relationships between
70 sets of properties. Chapter 2 leaves something to be desired though. The
71 chapter addresses quite extensively the issue of how to draw the boundaries of
72 mechanisms but does not engage with some recent influential theories on evidence
73 for constitutive relevance, notably regularity and no-decoupling accounts of
74 evidence for constitutive relevance. I feel that more could have been said here.
75 Chapters 3–5 are very relevant contributions to the underdeveloped literature on
76 mechanistic modeling. Glennan defends the view that models are our source of
77 generality. Models can function as generalized representations of classes of similar
78 targets and support the making of generalizations about those targets. Abstraction
79 and idealization loom large in this endeavor, for ‘‘the inevitable abstractions and
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80 idealizations… help us find generality in a world of mechanisms that are ultimately
81 particular, localized, and heterogeneous’’ (83). The New Mechanical Philosophy
82 sets out to clarify how we may come to explain the workings of mechanisms
83 through models, and how we may classify particular mechanisms into kinds and
84 types through the usage of models. All this is very much to be applauded since,
85 although the term MECHANISTIC MODEL is frequently used in analyses of
86 mechanistic explanation, there are little in-depth analyses of mechanistic modeling
87 practices—in particular when it comes to matters of idealization. Chapter 3, for
88 instance, offers a welcome discussion on different ways to understand how-possibly
89 models, viz. as conjectures about actual mechanisms or as models of mechanistic
90 possibilities. And Chapter 4 gives an insightful account of the classification of
91 mechanisms into kinds through models—in brief, to the extent that particular
92 mechanisms can be adequately represented by the same model, they count as
93 instances of the same mechanism kind. That said, as in the NMP literature in
94 general, more attention could have, and should have, been paid to the precise
95 functions or roles that idealizations may serve in mechanistic modeling. Idealiza-
96 tion, quite rightly, is taken to be in the service of generality, but it is not spelled out
97 in detail how this works. Chapter 4 suggests briefly that idealizations are justified as
98 long as they do not distort important difference makers which, in turn, suggests that
99 one role idealizations may serve is to highlight what is not explanatorily important,
100 by distorting features that do not make a difference or only make a negligible
101 difference. However, given the quite extensive modeling literature on the different
102 functions that idealizations can serve, I would have liked to see more engagement
103 with this literature for this would clarify the ways in which we precisely attain
104 generality through the use of idealizations.
105 Chapter 8 specifies a model-based account of scientific explanation. This account
106 is put to use to spell out commonalities and differences between mechanistic
107 explanation and other types of explanation, viz. bare causal explanations and types
108 of non-causal explanations, and to recast the debate over ontic and epistemic
109 conceptions of scientific explanation, a debate that has generated a lot of attention
110 and confusion recently. Chapter 8 does a wonderful job in positioning mechanistic
111 explanation in the explanatory zoo, alongside non-causal explanations, such as
112 design and optimality explanations. Unfortunately, this chapter also perpetuates the
113 common misconception in the NMP literature that the ontic conception of
114 explanation can be salvaged by appealing to ontic constraints on or ontic aspects of
115 explanatory representations. Glennan aims to account for ‘‘different aspects of
116 successful scientific representation’’ (222), inter alia epistemic and ontic ones. In
117 expounding his multi-aspect approach to explanation, he writes that ‘‘to recognize
118 the epistemic aspect of explanation is to recognize that explanation always requires
119 representation … to recognize the ontic aspect of explanation is to recognize that
120 whether a proffered explanation makes the grade will depend on what actually
121 occurs in the world’’ (222). Yet, by stressing that explanation always involves
122 representation, this position is inconsistent with the ontic conception, which is non-
123 representational. Interestingly, since the epistemic conception readily accommo-
124 dates the constraint that the goodness of explanatory representations is constrained
125 by what is being described—indeed, one would be hard-pressed to disagree with this
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126 thought—The New Mechanical Philosophy in fact advertises an epistemic
127 conception of explanation.
128 Let me close by saying that important works deserve some critical remarks.
129 Glennan’s The New Mechanical Philosophy is essential reading for anyone wanting
130 to know what NMP is all about.
131
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